In a three-period¯nite competitive exchange economy with incomplete¯nan-cial markets and retrading, we show the generic existence of¯nancial innovation which decreases equilibrium price volatility (as well as innovation which increases it). The existence is obtained under conditions of su±cient market incompleteness. The¯nancial innovation may consist of an asset which is only traded at time zero, or retraded, and with payo®s only at the terminal date. The existence is shown to be robust in the asset payo® space. Journal of Economic Literature Classi¯cation Numbers: C60, D52, G10.
Introduction
This paper examines the robustness of the hypothesis that higher degrees of market incompleteness induce higher equilibrium asset price volatility on¯nancial markets. Market volatility has been the focus of empirical tests of asset pricing models and business cycle theories (the literature is huge and cannot be summarized here; an example is Shiller (1981) ). These studies mainly found excess volatility of stock returns, or deviations of asset price volatility from the one determined by \fundamentals". Traditionally the benchmark volatility is derived from a complete-market, in¯nite-horizon model of consumption and investment. Some authors (cfr. Allen and Gale (1994) ) have attributed the excess volatility to the joint presence of liquidity e®ects and of restrictions to¯nancial markets participation, hence suggesting that a possible misspeci¯cation of the general competitive model lies in the assumption that¯nancial markets are perfect. Since market incompleteness is a form of restricted participation, one could ask whether the increase in volatility is a phenomenon that generally extends to incomplete versus complete (or less incomplete)¯nancial markets. Related to these issues, questions have emerged about the e®ects of¯nancial innovation on asset price stability. Few studies have already speci¯cally examined¯nancial innovation in relation to price volatility from a theoretical viewpoint (Detemple and Selden (1991) , for option contracts, and Detemple (1996) , Zapatero (1998) , for general¯nancial innovation in a general equilibrium setting, with asymmetric information or heterogeneous beliefs), although restrictions have been imposed on preferences or asset payo®s, that is, dividend processes, as asset payo®s are referred to in those models.
In this paper we take advantage of a very simple model of discrete-time dynamic trading of assets and multiple goods in a¯nite economy to allow for general preferences, endowments and asset structures. In our setup,¯nancial innovation is not the result of optimizing behavior. We do not seek to explain why markets are incomplete or why new assets are introduced, but we take this as given and concentrate on the equilibrium e®ects of having di®erent¯nancial structures. We impose time and state separability of preferences, and use von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utilities. This is done for the sake of exposition, and because of the wide use of the separable case in the¯nance and macroeconomic literature. Any weaker version of separability (such as time nonseparability, or a habit formation assumption) also gives rise to the same results as the ones presented in this paper. The model we use covers any¯nite time horizon trading economy, even though here we focus on the threeperiod case. Although a new¯nancial asset generally plays a role as a hedging device and as an information vehicle, the result in this paper does not address di®erential information economies. Rather, we concentrate on the spanning role of¯nancial assets. Future work should introduce asymmetric information in the model to capture the e®ects on price volatility of the information conveyed by¯nancial innovation. Also, nancial innovation in our model may not complete¯nancial markets.
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With these maintained general speci¯cations, we show that, generically, there is some¯nancial innovation leading to a volatility decrease, while some other leads to an increase in volatility. The intuition here is, along the lines of what is known in the constrained suboptimality literature (see for example Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) ), that price e®ects induced by payo® changes may allow modifying asset prices in such a way to control volatilities at pleasure. To get the result, we have to impose some extra conditions on the economy. When uncertainty is represented by S states of the world in each contingency, if H is the number of (types of) households in the economy and J is the number of preexisting assets, our theorem holds when S(S ¡ J) + S + 1 ¡ J¸H+J: If one allows for more periods, an analogous condition must hold. Generally, similar conclusions can be drawn provided the uncertainty in the economy is su±ciently large. This condition is generally su±cient, and also tight within our di®erential framework of analysis, in the sense that this condition is required to obtain robust (open sets of new assets have the same e®ect on open sets of economies, for almost all initial economies) and predictable (locally one-to-one) e®ects of¯nancial innovation. The exact meaning of this will become apparent after Lemma 4.1.
Hence, other things equal,¯nancial innovation allows the (robust) controllability of price volatility when uncertainty is high, and volatility-reducing¯nancial innovation can be found more easily when there is more uncertainty in the economy. Since more states of nature typically induce more equilibrium volatility in¯nancial markets to start with, the main theorem also shows that the more volatile prices are expected to be, the more controllable volatility is through¯nancial innovation.
The last section of this paper shows that it is easier to reduce volatility through nancial innovation when traders cannot rebalance their holdings of the new asset. More precisely, in the case of impossibility of retrading the condition linking the number of states, households and assets is weaker than in the other case. Now, suppose that over-the-counter¯nancial contracts can be designed in a more customized way and retrading of these contracts is more di±cult than on standardized contracts exchanged on organized markets. Then it can be argued that in the absence of greater levels of uncertainty, it may be convenient to introduce hedging instruments over the counter as opposed to widely retraded assets, when the intent is to control price volatility of existing¯nancial assets (and in the absence of other e®ects, such as informational).
We give our results two interpretations. First, and regarding excess volatility and market incompleteness, we give conditions under which nothing so general can be deduced as \the more¯nancial markets are incomplete, the higher the volatility". Such statements may hold only in speci¯c incomplete, or otherwise restricted, markets (as in Zapatero, for the¯rst, and in Allen and Gale for the second case, e.g.). In fact, our results suggest that when there is considerable uncertainty in the economy, more incompleteness may be associated to lower volatility. Second, and regarding statements on the destabilizing e®ects of¯nancial innovation, we remark that any strong conclusion against¯nancial innovation strictly depends on the speci¯c parametric assumptions. A small deviation from those assumptions may moderate the results (this is a direct consequence of genericity in endowments, security payo®s and utilities). We elaborate on a well-known example of preferences for which¯nancial innovation always yields no change in volatility, motivating the perturbation of utilities as a necessary condition for robustness, and also showing that controlling volatility through nancial innovation is not an obvious task even if we are allowed to introduce any asset we please.
From a normative viewpoint, our robust controllability result may suggest that nancial innovation can be used as an instrument of volatility control, perhaps but not only by the monetary authority. This paper of course does not address the informational requirements needed for the implementation of this policy instrument, a topic linked to the recoverability literature in incomplete markets. Moreover, we can say at least that the new¯nancial asset may not necessarily take the form of a futures contract or of a call or put option on the underlying asset. In this framework, an option is characterized by a¯xed functional form and by only one extra parameter, the strike price. This seems not su±cient to guarantee robustness of volatility-reducing e®ects. Technically, this paper extends to a multiperiod setting the di®erential framework developed in Cass and Citanna (1998) to study¯nancial innovation in incomplete markets, itself a rami¯cation of the long-debated issue of constrained suboptimality (see Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998)). We believe that the study of the e®ects of¯nancial innovation cannot be reduced to welfare comparisons, already addressed in the literature (see Cass and Citanna, (1998) , or Elul, (1995), for example). We study the e®ects of innovation on price volatility, which cannot be de¯ned in the standard two-period exchange economy. Moreover, the restrictions that naturally arise on the payo® matrix representing¯nancial markets with dynamic trading are not encompassed by the previous theorems, and provide the structural motivation to this work. Finally, in the volatility context we can extend the controllability result to compare incomplete and (dynamically) complete markets, impossible in the case of welfare analysis. The analysis of equilibrium volatility is meant to be illustrative of more general issues whose study can be easily embedded in this framework, provided they can be represented by a smooth function de¯ned over the equilibrium set. In this sense, our results do not directly address the robustness of the work by Detemple and Selden (1991) on option contracts. 3 An example of which is the study of the robustness of the di®erences in the price level of one asset depending on markets being complete or not, also known as the`precautionary savings' e®ect.
The model
We consider a standard model of an intertemporal, competitive, pure-exchange economy with incomplete¯nancial markets. Let t denote the time period, with t = 0; 1; :::T; where t = 0 is today, and t = T is the terminal date. Although the formalization encompasses any¯nite-horizon economy, we will focus on the three-period case, i.e., T = 2. Uncertainty is represented by 1 < S < 1 states of the world in each period t > 0 and at each spot, or realization of previous uncertainty, indexed by s: Although this is not strictly necessary, to simplify the notation we take the number of states to be constant over time and at each spot. The following tree structure represents uncertainty in this economy,
The total number of states in the economy is therefore given by P T t=0 S t : In this paper, we assume that all the information in the economy is publicly available. We will assume that J¯nancial instruments are tradable today and that S > J; sō nancial markets are incomplete, even dynamically. These instruments are long-term securities, since they can be held until the terminal date T . Nevertheless, they can be retraded in any period t < T: It is notationally convenient also to represent the retraded instruments as independent assets i; where i = 0; ::; I; and I = J P T ¡1 t=0 S t .
We will also index states in di®erent periods all together as spots s; and will write
There are H households (also referred to as traders) indexed by h: At each date and state, there are C commodities or goods indexed by c, with C > 1 4 . The commodity (and endowment) space is taken to be R G ++ , where G = C(S+1). A typical household's preferences are represented by the utility function u h : R G ++ ! R, which is assumed to be smooth, di®erentially strictly increasing and di®erentially strictly concave, and to have the closure of indi®erence surfaces contained in R G ++ . Moreover, the utility will be assumed of the form
with ¼ s > 0 and
That is, we consider von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, with objective probabilities and time separable utility. The case of nonseparability (time and state) is easier to deal with, and follows from the proofs given See Elul (1997), whose robustness conditions can be simpli¯ed using our framework. 4 Contrary to Cass and Citanna (1998) , robustness can be shown here also in the case when C = 1; but the equations considered are slightly di®erent, and we do not give the computational details in this paper.
below. We choose to present the results with this speci¯cation because it is the most widely used, although maybe not the most economically plausible. As for using objective probabilities, again this choice derives from the need of comparison between our statements and those made in the related literature, and to simplify computations already burdensome. The conditions of Theorem 4.2 may be slightly altered by a subjective probability speci¯cation (due to the need of keeping track of volatility as perceived by each household, and therefore requiring a higher degree of market incompleteness for the theorem to hold), but the general framework of analysis does not change. Note that one can interpret ¼ s as derived from a (stationary) probability measure ¼ on the states s > 0 in the following standard way:
where ¼(sjs 0 ) is the conditional probability of state s in period t = 2 after state s 0 occurs in period t = 1; and s; s 0 2 S. ¼ 0 is interpreted as a simple intertemporal preference parameter, not as a probability.
The space of households' endowments is E = (R 
and q 2 R I we denote the consumption bundle and the asset portfolio for household h, the commodity price vector and the asset price vector, respectively. It will be convenient to take quantity vectors as columns, and price vectors as rows.
The¯nancial structure is represented by an (S + 1) £ I-dimensional matrix of prices and payo®s R expressed in terms of a num ¶ eraire commodity, which we take to be the last at each spot s, i.e., c = C. It is apparent that we are dealing here with a special case of the usual standard incomplete market model, where the matrix R assumes the following form R = ª : 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 is an S + 1-dimensional square matrix of prices of the num ¶ eraire commodity, and Y (s); with s = 0; 1; :::; S is an S £ J matrix of payo®s for the traded security. We will assume that each Y (s) be in general position 6 . The argument of this paper adapts to the one-asset case (J = 1) with this condition becoming Y (s) = Y À 0; which is consistent with intertemporal models of stock and bond trading. Denote by ¡ ½ R SJ(S+1) the space of such matrices. Note that an asset j 2 J in this economy promises to deliver y s;j (0) units of the num ¶ eraire good in state s in period t = 1, and y s is a J £ 1 vector of prices, which are endogenously determined in equilibrium, and which correspond to`di®erent' assets as a function of the state. So, each asset j 2 J is exchanged at price q 0;j at t = 0; and at price q s;j in state s and period t = 1; and q s = (q s;j ) j2J ; for s = 0; 1; :::; S: for the payo® vector of a newly introduced asset; an element of R S : This framework of analysis of dynamic trading in¯nancial markets is common, apart from slight di®erences in the timing of trading or payo® payments, to several treatments of sequential trading in rational expectations models, and in particular to a model by Du±e and Shafer (1986) . It su±ces to note at this stage that the economy is a dynamic one in the usual sense that trading occurs sequentially, but plans are made once at time t = 0. Indeed, in the¯rst period (t = 0), households maximize utility given rational expectations about future prices, and the existing ¯nancial structure, making plans for trading commodities and assets today and tomorrow. Then, today's trades are carried through, and households consume and hold portfolios to transfer wealth in the future. Tomorrow, given the state of the world, households ful¯ll their¯nancial obligations, and then again trade commodities and nancial instruments, and consume. At T = 2; again households ful¯ll their¯nancial obligations, trade commodities and consume. Formally, a¯nancial equilibrium is a vector ((x h ; b h ) H h=1 ; p; q) such that: (H) given p; q; households optimize, that is, for every h, (x h ; b h ) solves the problem is an (S + 1) £ C price matrix, e h 2 R G ++ is the household's endowment, and (M) markets clear, that is,
An equilibrium is represented in extended form by the system of equations 7 consisting of both the households' Kuhn-Tucker conditions and the market-clearing conditions, . . .
++ is the household's vector of Lagrange multipliers (i.e., marginal utilities of wealth), z h = x h ¡ e h is the household's vector of excess demands.
We de¯ne volatility of the j ¡ th¯nancial instrument as
In other words, we look at price volatility, as opposed to return volatility. Return volatility can be studied with a slight modi¯cation of the de¯nition given above. Note that if ¼ depends on h; more than one de¯nition of volatility has to be used simultaneously.
Existence of equilibrium for this model has essentially been analyzed by Du±e and Shafer (1986) . Retrading can potentially lead to a matrix R whose rank is less than I: To see this, let Q be the S £ J matrix of security prices at time t = 1: The problem of loss of rank, i.e., redundancy, arises because Y (0) + Q may not have full rank. This will hold generically in endowments and security payo®s. Note that for J = 1 the rank result follows immediately from the assumption that Y À 0, in which case the existence proof follows from Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986):
To state the existence result for J > 1, we parametrize economies by endowments and securities only,¯xing preferences once and for all.
8 Let £´E £ ¡ denote the parameter space. The proof of this Proposition is in essence identical to the one in Du±e and Shafer, hence the reader is referred to that paper for the details. An argument already adapted to this paper's notation is available from this author upon request. We now turn to adjusting a framework formerly developed in Cass and Citanna for comparing equilibria before and after the introduction of new assets.
Introducing a new asset into the economy
For the model described in Section 2, the basic idea of the analysis of the impact of¯nancial innovation on volatility can be easily reconduced to the framework for the study of the welfare impact of¯nancial innovation as found in Cass and Citanna (1998). Although it will become apparent that the logic of the analysis follows very closely that paper, we stress that a straightforward application of the theorems provided there is not possible in this multiperiod setup with separable utilities. To reiterate, the steps of the analysis are identical, but the proofs di®er because of the special structure of the payo® matrix R. Proofs of Lemmas 3.2, 4.1, of Theorem 4.2, case b), and of the lemmas and theorem in Section 4.2 are similar but not encompassed by statements contained in Cass and Citanna. For instance, in order to derive the condition on multipliers, Cass and Citanna assumed that either the last I rows of the matrix had full rank (general nonseparable case), or that the payo® matrix was in general position (additively separable utility, treated in their Appendix). Here we tied our hands as for the speci¯cation of the R matrix, given the dynamic structure of the model, and R is no longer in general position.
Obviously, our proofs in this paper show that the general position of R is not necessary to obtain results in this model 9 . Because of the similarities in the analyses of the two problems (welfare impact and volatility impact), we will show how to procede with the general logic, we will leave the unchanged proofs to the reader, but will provide the di®ering proofs in the Appendix.
It is convenient to introduce some general notation for representing equations (2.2). We¯rst normalize the num ¶ eraire commodity price at each spot, given that households' budget constraints are homogeneous of degree zero in p s;C , all s. Hence, p s;C = 1, all s (for simplicity, hereafter we will rede¯ne q=p 0;C as q). Moreover, we drop S + 1 commodity market clearing conditions, say, those corresponding to the num ¶ eraire commodity at each spot, by utilizing the analogue of Walras' law. Let z n h be z h less the num ¶ eraire commodity at each spot. Let p n be the commodity price vector without the normalized components.
Let
be the mapping representing the left-hand side of (2.2) after the above changes, where ¥ n1 is the n 1 -dimensional space of endogenous variables », with
and the economy is again parametrized by endowments and securities only. An equilibrium in the original economy is then represented by the equation
We will consider a (smooth) function, de¯ned over the equilibrium manifold of a (now multiperiod and)¯ctitious economy, i.e. the economy where the new asset is chosen so that at the original values of the endogenous variables it is redundant, but traded. For the original economy and given a¯xed µ 2 £ ¤ , we can describe the equilibria by the zeros of a mapping
where F 0 1 is going to be the mapping into R n1 describing the same equations as those of the original equilibrium, but modi¯ed according to the designer's intervention, while F 2 is going to be the mapping into R n¡n1 describing the arbitrage-pricing and market-clearing conditions for the new assets. T is the space of instrumental variables, including both direct policy variables (new asset payo®s) and related market variables (new asset prices and holdings). 9 Since we can prove the lemmas and theorems essentially without changing conditions on S; I and H; ex post this di®erence turns out not to substantially matter. Indeed, and to anticipate the presentation of our results, in the Cass and Citanna paper the controllability is obtained if S + 1 ¡ I¸H + H; while here if S + 1 ¡ I¸H + J (Theorem 4.2). The¯rst H conditions account for the new no arbitrage equations, and the last conditions (H there, J here) account for the number of objectives to control.
If we can show that there is a subvector of n ¡ n 1 instrumental variables ¿ 00 for which a regularity-like result can be established, that is,
where ¿ 0 is another subvector of ¿¯xed at the value ¿ 0 so to obtain the original equilibrium, then the set
where T ¹ ¿ 0 is an open neighborhood of ¹ ¿ 0 in T , is a smooth,¯nite-dimensional manifold, by a straightforward application of the preimage theorem (see Guillemin and Pollack (1974, p. 21) , for instance).
Our standard reference to » as \endogenous variables" is justi¯ed by the following lemma, which is a well-known regularity result, and is therefore stated here without proof.
Generic here means in an open, full-measure subset, although in the next section, when introducing volatilities in the analysis, we will use the term in a topological sense only. One property of the Lagrange multipliers and two of equilibrium commodity prices and asset price volatilities are summarized in the following lemma, and will be quite useful in the ensuing analysis. Their demonstration basically involves routine applications of a transversality theorem, hence the proof will be omitted. Let ¾(s) be a permutation function of f0; 1; ::; Sg into itself.
Lemma 3.2. Consider the solutions to F 1 (»; µ) = 0: Then, Notice that if J = 1; and it is assumed that Y À 0; we can always extract H spots out of the last S 2 ; since the¯rst S + 1 = I rows of R form the required full-ranked matrix.
It will be convenient to let
which is therefore also a generic subset of £ ¤ . From now on, µ 2 £ u :
is onto for all such points. We can restate this condition in terms of the rank of a suitable matrix, which can be expressed using the complementary condition in terms of the system of equations
where a is an (n + J)-dimensional vector. Financial innovation generated by altering the yields from redundant assets can bring about an increase in volatility if the system of equations (3.2) has no solution. 10 We will establish that this property obtains at every equilibrium for an open and dense set of economies. Having accomplished this, we will show robustness in the space of nancial innovations, that is openness of the set of volatility-reducing innovations. It will simply follow from establishing that, for an open and dense set of economies, some altered equilibrium (after volatility-reducing innovation) is regular, just as was the original equilibrium.
E®ects on market volatility
When an asset is redundant, it has no e®ect on the market allocation. If such a new asset is introduced into the economy, then (2.2) becomes . . .
whereb h ; all h;q and y are the new asset holdings, price and yields, and r = µ ¡q y ¶ .
The left-hand side of the equations (4.1) corresponds to our function F , when (b;q; y) = ((b h ; all h);q; y) is identi¯ed with ¿ . A designer can introduce a new asset by choosingb;q and y, with the constraint thatb andq are equilibrium asset holdings (so they satisfy market clearing) and equilibrium price for given yields y (so they satisfy a no-arbitrage condition). That is, the constraints are . . . which would have to be appended to equations (2.2), while simultaneously modifying the households' budget constraints accordingly. The full set of constraints facing the designer is then described by equations (4.1). The dimension of the range of F just equals the number of equations de¯ning an equilibrium with I + 1 assets. Note that the designer uses H + 1 + S instruments (so that T = R H+1+S ), of which (as many as) H + 1 cannot be chosen independently, given equations (4.2).
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If the completely redundant asset y = 0 is introduced, arbitrage-pricing requires thatq = 0 as well, so that market-clearing is the only e®ective restriction onb (and the planner is free to choose all but two of the remaining \policy" instruments,q and b h ; some h). Thus, in the¯ctitious equilibrium, a natural choice for the subvector of has no solution. This last is the result that we now verify for an open and dense set of economies parameterized by both endowments and utility functions. Intuitively, we are using H +1+S instruments to achieve J objectives, the changes in volatility. The introduction of a new asset carries additional constraints in the form of H arbitrage pricing equations and one asset market clearing condition. Note that dim T = H + 1 + S¸H + 1 + J; where H + 1 = n ¡ n 1 ; which is equivalent to S¸J, obviously true in our context: However, the previous lemma indicates that this is not enough. H instruments (the new asset holdings) are indeed useless, because they only control market clearing. The remaining S + 1; the new asset price and yields, are also constrained to spread their e®ect through elements of the orthogonal space of R (through the¸'s), losing I dimensions. Hence S + 1 ¡ I of these instruments must 12 The argument, and only in Theorem 4.2, requires that ¹ b h 6 = 0, all h. be used to accomplish the control task, but they need to satisfy the H no arbitrage equations as well. Therefore, S + 1 ¡ I ¡ H are really the independent instruments. The following theorem shows that condition S + 1 ¡ I ¡ H¸J itself is necessary (in our framework) and su±cient in order to show that the equilibrium volatility function is locally onto.
Theorem 4.2.
On an open and dense set£ ½ £ £ U, at any original equilibrium, G is a submersion, so that there are new assets y 0 and y 00 whose introduction decreases and increases volatility, respectively, provided S + 1 ¡ I¸H+J (that is, again, S(S ¡ J) + S + 1 ¡ J¸H + J).
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is rather technical and is deferred to the Appendix. From an economic viewpoint, only two aspects of the proof are worth mentioning here. First, the proof shows that it would be possible to choose the new asset payo®s out of the last spots, if these were in su±cient number. That is, if a stronger condition holds, and S 2 ¡J(S +1)¸H +J; then the new asset payo®s can be chosen only at the terminal date. When J = 1; no extra condition has to be explicitly imposed in order to establish the dependence of the payo® speci¯cation on the terminal date, because the condition occurs automatically. Second, in proving Theorem 4.2 we show that it is always possible to take as \independent" the subvector of instrumental variables
and to¯x r ¾(s) ; for ¾(s)¸H + J; and b b h ; for h > 1. 13 Taking advantage of this last observation, we can state and prove a corollary which shows the robustness of the existence of volatility-reducing innovation. It will be convenient hereafter to simply use ¿ in place of (b; r).
Corollary 4.3. On an open and dense set£
¤ ½£, at any original equilibrium, there is some altered equilibrium which is (i) volatility-reducing and (ii) regular, as well as some altered equilibrium which is (i) volatility-increasing and (ii) regular, so that there are open sets of new assets Y 0 and Y 00 such that the introduction of y 0 2 Y 0 or y 00 2 Y 00 can decrease or increase market volatility, respectively, provided S(S ¡ J) + S + 1 ¡ J¸H + J.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Two examples of negligible economies
To convince the reader that utility perturbations are needed (that is, for density), we have elaborated on a well-known example for one-period trading models (see Magill and Quinzii, (1996) ) of an economy with incomplete markets and linear-quadratic utility functions. The example shows that¯xing speci¯c preferences leads to no changes in asset prices due to¯nancial innovation, therefore to no changes in volatility.
A second example is provided which shows: a) how our result deals with incomplete vsus complete asset markets; b) why in the absence of aggregate risk completing markets may reduce the volatility of the preexisting asset no matter what new asset is introduced, but again that the situation is not robust to parameter speci¯cations.
First example For this purpose, assume that u h takes the form
where v : R C ++ ! R is a smooth, di®erentially strictly increasing and concave, homogeneous of degree one function, and
Then preferences are homothetic and spot-separable, and spot commodity equilibrium prices are independent of the income distribution across agents and across states. Then the portfolio choice only a®ects the level of consumption in each spot, but not the commodity prices. 
for all s; which shows that p s only depends on aggregate resources, not on income distribution (hence, and a fortiori, not on¯nancial innovation): Therefore one can reduce the trader's multi-commodity maximization problem to a one-commodity maximization: after de¯ning m 
At this point, the linear-quadratic assumption on u h leads to the following equilibrium asset prices
where ¦(s) is the S¡dimensional square, diagonal matrix of conditional probabilities given state s has occurred, s = 0; 1; :::; S: Neither of these expressions changes as we add a new asset.
Second example
Consider an economy with H = 3; S = 2 and C = 2. 
and no restriction is imposed on endowments at time t = 0 for c = 1. Assume that to start with there are J = 2 assets in the economy, with payo® matrix Y independent of s and with rank equal to 2, and satisfying the condition
where 1 T is a 2-dimensional row vector of ones. Consider the walrasian model associated with this economy. It can easily be shown that the following is the unique walrasian equilibrium pricep:p s;c = 1 for all (s; c) with s > 0; and for (0; 2), whilê
, so that markets are complete at these prices (i.e., rank R = I). Then there exist b h 2 R 2 ; all h; such thatâ(x h ¡ e h ) = Rb h and 1 T R = 0; whereâ is the usual commodity price matrix atp; andx h is the walrasian consumption: Letting¸h = ¹ h 1 for all h; we see thatp is also the unique complete markets equilibrium for this economy.
If J = 1; the incomplete market economy will typically result in equilibria wherȩ s h 6 =¸s 0 h for some s 6 = s 0 : That is, we keep preferences as given, and change endowments but always constrain them to be identical in the aggregate as explained above, and select only payo® matrices with strictly positive yields for all s. This is obtained through a standard round of transversality (here we need to have one commodity at time t = 0 not constrained to have¯xed aggregate endowments).
Notice that in the complete market economy, q s = q s 0 for all s; s 0 , so that asset volatility is zero when markets are complete, and will be typically positive for the remaining asset when markets are incomplete. Finally, note that the absence of aggregate risk can be accomodated in our setup, but it is not generic, and this is why the example works, even though the condition for the application of the theorem is satis¯ed: 1 + S ¡ I¸H + J; that is, 1 + 6 ¡ 3¸3 + 1:
Innovation with retrading
In this section we consider the e®ects on volatility of the introduction of a new security that can be retraded at time t = 1: In the previous section we dealt with innovative instruments that could not be retraded between today, time of the innovation, and the terminal date. Although some hedging instruments which are traded over the counter present this one-time trading feature, most newly traded securities are marketed in exchanges where retrading is possible. It turns out that the general framework of Section 3 is applicable to this case in a fruitful manner, and almost the same analysis developed in Section 4 carries through. In particular Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 can be recovered when the new asset can be retraded, provided we change slightly Lemma 3.2 (i). Since the proofs of the results are similar to those presented in the previous sections, the details are omitted. The bottom line of this section is that retrading makes controllability more di±cult, in the sense that the condition used to obtain volatility-reducing (or volatility-increasing) innovation is stronger than with no retrading. Introducing an asset with retrading corresponds to introducing S + 1 new markets. Although we have more assets to use, the number of payo®s we control is unchanged (totalling S), while the number of constraints increases, because retrading requires more no arbitrage equations for the new asset.
LetR be the matrix representing the payo®s and prices of the new¯nancial instrument.R is just a copy of R; that is if we were to assume that J = 1; with arbitrary payo®s Y; taken in general to be di®erent across time and states. Let r s = (¡q s ; y(s)) ; for s = 0; 1; :::; S: We need to append S + 1 market clearing equations and ¡ S + 1 ¢ H pricing equations to the original equilibrium system. As before, we will call F the equilibrium function with these appended equations.
First, we need to strengthen Lemma 3.2. Let ¾ 0 be a permutation of the states fs; sS + 1; sS + 2; :::; sS + Sg; for each s = 0; 1; :::; S; with generic element ¾ 0 (s); that is, a permutation of the set including the direct successors of a state s and this state.
Lemma 4.4. Consider the solutions to F 1 (»; µ) = 0. Generically in £ ¤ , given any set of the S direct successors of the state s = 0; 1; ::; S; and a permutation ¾ 0 ;
Then we can prove the analogue of Lemma 4.1. Let r s = (r s00 ; r s000 ) = ((r The proof is based on the use of Lemma 4.4 and the fact that we can extract H states following and including each state s = 0; 1; :::; S for which the multiplier matrix has rank H.
Finally, Theorem 4.2 can be modi¯ed accordingly. We state here only one side of the result, the volatility-reducing part, although the theorem shows that both directions for volatility are possible.
Theorem 4.6.
On an open and dense set£ ½ £ £ U, at any original equilibrium, G is a submersion, so that in particular there is a new asset with retrading y, whose introduction decreases volatility provided 1 + S ¡ J¸H+J.
The proof of this theorem would show that only the terminal payo®s need to be chosen appropriately. Moreover, it is immediate to see that the condition 1 + S ¡ JḨ + J needs to hold only for those many states following one state in period t = 1: In other words, if the number of states varied from node to node, a weaker condition than the one used in the theorem could be adopted.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1
The Jacobian matrix of F at a point as de¯ned above is Lemma 3.1 implies that the block in the upper left corner (corresponding to D » F 0 1 ) has full rank. But Lemma 3.2 (i) implies that, when S + 1 ¡ I¸H, the block in the lower right corner (corresponding to Db ;r F 2 ) also has full rank; simply consider the columns corresponding to the particular variablesb 1 and r 00 (that is, corresponding to Db 1;r 00 F 2 ). Hence, since the block in the lower left corner (corresponding to D » F 2 ) is 0, the matrix D »;b 1 ;r 00 F , and, a fortiori, the matrix D »;b;r F must have full rank.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof is carried out in two steps.
Step 1 -Openness.
All we need to show is that the projection ¼ : This follows from the fact that the set of solutions to equations (4.3) yields a closed subset of the solutions to (5.1). Thus, given properness, the complement of its projection into the parameter space is open. But properness can be established through a well-known argument (see Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci, Lemma 1, e.g.), whose details we therefore omit.
Step 2 -Density.
Without loss of generality, we will assume that a (µ; u) is chosen in an open and dense subset of £ £ U such that µ 2 £ u ; with all the stated properties. Moreover, we will assume that at (µ; u) there is only one equilibrium. To establish density in £ £ U, we show that the system (4.3) almost never has a solution for an open and full-measure subset of fµg £ A, where µ 2 £ u and
H is the space representing a¯nite-dimensional parametrization of the households' utility functions around u (again, see Cass and Citanna, e.g.).
The reader should keep in mind that we need to be able to perturb utility spotby-spot, at the same time keeping the functional form constant across spots. This could be done if we had . . .
where a Since they are all identical, hence redundant, we drop H ¡ 1 equations corresponding, in particular, to all but thē rst of (5.2.6). Given that S +1¡I¸H+J; and consequently that S +1¡H ¡J¸0, it follows that the equations (5.2) still outnumber the additional variables a by this di®erence. So we can drop all but H + J of (5.2.7) { as indicated in square brackets { and still have one more equation than variables. Now observe that the restriction on the domain in (5.2) , that is, (5.1), is equivalent to
and r = ¹ r = 0.
= 0. It remains to show that the Jacobian matrix of the truncated subsystem in (5.2) (with respect to (a; A)) has full rank, in order to apply the transversality theorem, and to conclude that, generically in parameterized utility functions, the full system (4.3) has no solution. We need to consider few cases, since the matrix of derivatives of equation ( 
We need to look at system (5.2) more closely. We rewrite its equations below, state by state:
We have substituted for ® s h = 0; discovering that this implies°s h = 0 and ± s = 0 for these s 2 S 0 h : This means that the corresponding equations (5.2.1) will drop for these spots s 2 S 0 h . Note that also some equations among (5.2.4) have (possibly, for s 2 S) dropped out of the system. We have at least
h extra equations. If we decide not to perturb the zeroed variables, we can drop some other equations, since now the equations still outnumber the unknowns by more than one. Notice also that equations (5.3.1) can be perturbed using the utility parameters A h ; equations (5.3.3a) and (5.3.4) can be perturbed using the ®'s as before, and equations (5.3.6) using2. We are left with perturbing equations (5. 
First, we throw away J equations (5.3.7), perturbing the remaining H using^: Equation (5.3.8) is perturbed using ¹. Note that equations (5.3.5) are now P h°h Q 2 h + ¹D q v = 0: They can be rewritten as 3.3b) , we use¯h. For h = 1; we keep equations (5.3.2) and perturb them with ²: Then we throw away equations (5.3.3b), we use¯1 to perturb equations (5.3.5). As for equations (5.3.7a), again we use°s h for h such that s = 2 S; which we can always do as explained in the previous subcase, and for equation (5.3.8) we use ¹.
This ends the proof of case b).
In this way, we have established density. It now follows that, in the (weakly) generic set of economies for which G is a submersion, we can construct a new asset y 0 = ¢y 0 6 =0 so that volatility increases in equilibrium, as well as a new asset y 00 = ¢y 00 6 = 0 so that volatility decreases. Proof of the Corollary to Theorem 4.2. We will focus on decrease of volatility, as the symmetric argument requires merely reversing an inequality. Fixb h = ¹ b h = 1; h > 1; and y ¾(s) = ¹ y ¾(s) = 0; ¾(s)¸H + J. Then, forμ 2£, consider the system of equations and inequalities describing pairs of¯ctitious and altered equilibria where the latter are both volatility-reducing and regular, that is, in the k 0 \variables" (»; ¢»; ¢¿; a) 2 ¥ n 1 £ N ¢»;¢¿ 00 £ N ¢¿ 000 £ f0g £ R n and`= J + G 2 HJ \parameters" (¢v; A) 2 N ¢u £ A . It is only tedious to show that, by virtue of the particular choice for ¹ y ¾(s) ; ¾(s)¸H + J, for N ¢»;¢¿ 00 ; N ¢¿ 00 and N ¢v (as well as A and O) su±ciently small, the Jacobian matrix of this system has full rank (by perturbing each equation using the variables listed alongside). Hence we can once again apply the transversality theorem, and conclude that, generically in the \parameters", (5.5) has no solution. Density then follows from the fact that b £ is open. The remainder of the argument is based on the implicit function theorem. Since it is always possible to restrict the analysis to the subset of utilities which have a compact domain containing the total resources of the given economy, and this subset is a Banach space, then (locally) the altered equilibrium depends smoothly on the yields from the volatility-reducing new asset.
